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Abstract Debates on the role of biotechnology in food production are beset with 
notorious ambiguities. This already applies to the term “biotechnology” itself. Does 
it refer to the use and modification of living organisms in general, or rather to a 
specific set of technologies developed quite recently in the form of bioengineering 
and genetic modification? No less ambiguous are discussions concerning the 
question to what extent biotechnology must be regarded as ‘‘unnatural.’’ In this 
article it will be argued that, in order to disentangle some of the ambiguities 
involved, we have to broaden the temporal horizon of the debate. Ideas about 
biotechniques and naturalness have evolved in various socio-historical contexts and 
their historical origins will determine to a considerable extent their actual meaning 
and use in contemporary deliberations. For this purpose, a comprehensive timetable 
is developed, beginning with the Neolithic revolution *  10,000 years ago (resulting 
in the emergence of agriculture and the Common Human Pattern) up to the biotech 
revolution as it has evolved from the 1970s onwards—sometimes referred to as a 
second ‘‘Genesis.’’ The concept of nature that emerged in the context of the 
‘‘Common Human Pattern’’ differs considerably from traditional philosophical 
concepts of nature (such as coined by Aristotle), as well as from the scientific view 
of nature conveyed by the contemporary life sciences. A clarification of these 
different historical backdrops will allow us to understand and elucidate the con­
ceptual ambiguities that are at work in contemporary debates on biotechnology and 
the place of human beings in nature.
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Food is contested like never before (Lien & Anthony 2007, p. 413). 
Introduction
Debates on the role of biotechnology in food production are beset with a number of 
pernicious ambiguities. One of them concerns the concept of “biotechnology” 
itself. Some authors treat it as a rather general term, referring to any technological 
application using living organisms. Taken in this sense, biotechnology is about
10,000 years old and its history more or less reflects the history of mankind during 
the past ten millennia or so. For others, it refers to a specific set of techniques that 
emerged during the so-called biotech revolution. It the latter case, biotechnology is 
synonymous (more or less) with genetic engineering through gene transfer.1
Both definitions have normative consequences. By choosing one rather than the 
other, we are already positioning ourselves in the debate. Those who start from the 
more general definition are likely to argue (and rightly so, it seems) that the current 
biotech revolution is merely another chapter in a long history of biotechnological 
modifications, one that virtually coincides with human history itself. We have been 
modifying nature since time immemorial. Biotechnology is part of the human 
condition and modifying animals, plants, and environments has become a ‘‘natural’’ 
thing for us to do. Genetic engineering merely means that organisms can now be 
changed with greater levels of precision (see for instance Wolpert 1993; Miller 
2007). Those, however, who opt for the stricter definition tend to claim (and again, 
apparently for good reasons) that the biotech revolution as it has been evolving since 
the 1970s is an event of tremendous proportions, without precedent in history, a 
dramatic leap into a post-natural future (see for instance Rifkin 1998/1999; Bruce 
and Bruce 1999). From this perspective, biotechnology tends to be regarded as 
‘‘unnatural.’’ Both accounts seem viable, to some extent, but are difficult to combine 
into one single coherent and comprehensive view. Reiss and Straughan (1996) 
address the issue by focusing on scale and pace. Whereas “traditional” biotech­
nology has genetically altered only a limited number of species and at a relatively 
slow pace, genetic engineering is now characterized by its “suddenness” (p. 2), 
having the potential of affecting a considerable number of species. Yet, as increase 
in pace and scale seems a ‘‘natural'' feature of techno-cultural developments as 
such, the question whether we are really facing something unprecedented remains as 
yet undecided. According to Miller (2007), setting genetic engineering apart as 
unique merely serves political purposes, in the sense that (on conceptually 
questionable grounds) biotech products can subsequently become the target of 
excessive and ‘‘discriminatory'' forms of surveillance.
1 See for instance the W ikipedia article on biotechnology. Although the authors are aware that 
biotechnology is often used to refer more specifically to genetic engineering technologies o f present 
times, they nonetheless emphasize that, in their view, the term encompasses ‘‘a wider range and history of 
procedures for modifying biological organisms according to the needs of humanity, going back to the 
initial modifications of native plants into improved food crops through artificial selection and 
hybridization.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biotechnology.
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Situated at the other pole of the discursive battle-field, as the conceptual 
counterpart of (bio)technology as it were, we find a second ambiguity that torments 
the debate, namely the ambiguity concerning concepts such as ‘‘nature'' or 
‘‘naturalness.’’ Although some authors—notably analytically inclined professional 
bioethicists—try to convince us that such concepts should be avoided or even erased 
altogether, they continue to resurge, both in scholarly discourse and in public 
debate, either directly or in the disguise of associated concepts such as ‘‘integrity’’ 
(Verhoog 2003). Thus, they seem inevitable articulations of important intuitions. As 
such, they constitute a conceptual challenge that we will have to address (Zwart 
1994, 1998). In other words, although conceptual analysis is important, the 
problems involved in concepts such as ‘‘biotechnology'' or ‘‘naturalness'' are not of 
a purely semantic type.
One way to come to terms with them is to approach them from a historical angle, 
which is the route that will be taken in this paper. I will opt for an in-depth inquiry 
into the tensions that give rise to the semantic difficulties ‘‘at the surface,’’ as 
symptoms of more ‘‘chronic'' afflictions. For practical purposes, I will use the term 
‘‘biotechnology’’ to refer to modifications of living organisms in general, while the 
short-hand version ‘‘biotech’’ will refer to genetic engineering—to biotechnology 
stricto sensu—but this can only be a provisional ‘‘solution,’’ concealing rather than 
solving underlying tensions. Both definitions represent competing and incompatible 
views on the role of biotechnology in human life in general and food production in 
particular. I will argue that, in order to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of 
both accounts, the newness of the biotech revolution (as a transformation of epochal 
dimensions) can be best understood when it is seen against the backdrop of a long 
history of biotechnological transformations.
The question then becomes which particular events, which moments in time 
could serve as a backdrop, as historical markers, that will allow us to deepen our 
understanding of the significance of the current biotech revolution? A number of 
candidate events present themselves. Among continental philosophers it is 
established practice to start with the birth of philosophy, around 500BC, and the 
writings of Plato and Aristotle. Ancient Greek thinking often allows us to discern 
more precisely, and in a comparative manner so to speak, the newness or uniqueness 
of our contemporary practices and reflections, also concerning food (Zwart 2000). 
On the other hand, although ancient Greek philosophy, as a key component of the 
‘‘first’’ scientific revolution that occurred *  2,500 years ago in Ancient Greece, did 
have a tremendous impact on mathematics, philosophy, politics, and ethics, it hardly 
affected agriculture or ‘‘biotechnology'' directly. For reasons that will be explained 
more fully below, authors such as Plato and Aristotle did hardly concern themselves 
with concrete interactions with nature in rural agricultural environments.
Another dramatic turning point has been the Industrial Revolution that included 
the ‘‘industrialization'' of food production, based on a ‘‘scientification'' of our 
understanding of life, made possible by the work of scientists such as Lavoisier 
(chemistry of fermentation), Pasteur (microbiology of fermentation), and Mendel 
(genetics of selective breeding). Although hugely important in themselves, to allow 
these events to suffice as points of orientation would still reflect a certain level of 
short-sightedness. In order to really understand what is happening today, we have to
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broaden our perspective, our temporal horizon. The primary point of reference 
should be the Neolithic revolution, the emergence of agriculture (or, rather, of agri­
cultures, that is: of agricultural societies) that took place *  10,000 years ago, as the 
origin of what came to be known as the ‘‘Common Human Pattern’’ (CHP), a way of 
life that established itself throughout the human world, only to be disrupted by 
modern industrialization (Romein and Romein-Verschoor 1954). The Dutch 
historians Jan and Annie Romein defined the CHP as a stage in human history 
characterized by a wide-spread and relatively stable agricultural life-style, practiced 
in small-scale villages that were virtually self-supportive. Both events, the Neolithic 
revolution and the Industrial one, put the CHP between parentheses as it were, as the 
A and the X of a grand, but now closed, epoch.
If we analyze the course of events from such a perspective, moreover, it is 
important to emphasize that, until quite recently, agriculture, philosophy, and 
science constituted separate ‘‘streams’’ in history. Historically speaking, both a 
science of agriculture and a philosophy (or ethics) of agriculture are quite recent 
phenomena. The CHP, as a result of the Neolithic revolution, was based on 
practical, every-day knowledge forms that were transmitted through oral commu­
nication and on-site learning. Agriculture as a science-based practice is a fairly 
recent phenomenon. The scientific elucidation of some of the core techniques that 
brought about the Neolithic revolution, such as crop cultivation through selection 
and hybridization, or fermentation in the context of food preservation, took place 
rather recently, while ethical and/or philosophical reflections on food production 
and consumption have until quite recently remained neglected areas of discourse.
Nowadays, this has dramatically changed of course. In the context of the current 
biotech revolution, bioscience, biotechnology, and bioethics have become inti­
mately connected and have dramatically affected agricultural practices. Bioscience 
and biotechnology have almost completely merged into a field that might be 
referred to as the biotechnosciences, while food production in general, and biotech 
in particular, have become key issues on the agenda of contemporary philosophy, as 
is exemplified by the very existence of this journal. One could say that it took 
philosophers 25 centuries to acknowledge the pivotal importance of food production 
for human existence. But now, this has become inevitable. In order to come to terms 
with the present, to ‘‘capture it in thoughts,'' as Hegel phrased it, contemporary 
philosophy can no longer afford to leave food production out of the picture. Indeed, 
the merger of bioscience and biotechnology has led to a dramatic revaluation of all 
values, to use the Nietzschean phrase. As will be discussed more thoroughly below, 
what was regarded as ‘‘natural'' (and therefore ‘‘legitimate'') for millennia, in the 
context of the CHP, is no longer seen as such from a bio-scientific perspective.
The point of departure of this article is the conviction that the way in which we 
frame and address issues of biotechnology and naturalness will be determined to a 
considerable extent by the way we see ourselves against the backdrop of our past. 
Those who regard the CHP as the natural and truly human way of life are bound to 
frame the biotechnology debate differently than those who opt for a more science- 
oriented or ‘‘biologistic'' view. In final instance, the biotechnology debate is not 
about definitions, but about the question how to assess an on-going transformation 
of human life of dramatic proportions, the scope of which can only become clear
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against the backdrop of a concise account of human history as such. And this is 
precisely what this article sets out to do. As a kind of basic scheme or temporal 
horizon, the following timetable will serve as point of departure:
Years ago Revolutions Subsistence Philosophy Knowledge
~ 250,000 Emergence of Homo 
sapiens
Hunting and 
gathering; Promethean 
revolution 
(pyrotechnology)
Mythological
cosmologies
Primeval
knowledge
~ 100,000 Emergence of modern 
humans / migration 
“Out of Africa”
~ 10,000 Neolithic
revolution:
“biotechnological”
revolution
Emergence of agriculture Informal
practical knowledge
~ 5,000 Urban revolution Agriculture reaches 
what is now Western 
Europe
~ 2.500 Beginnings of empire 
building
Birth of
philosophical
cosmologies
“First”
scientific revolution
~ 1.500 Christianization Monasticism Metaphysical
cosmologies
~ 500 Modernity Colonization: 
migration of farmers, 
animals and crops
Rationalism “Second”
scientific revolution
~ 250 “Industrial” revolution “Second”
biotechnological
revolution
Romanticism and 
idealism
The idea of 
evolution
~50 Environmental
concerns
“Third”
biotechnological 
(or “green”) revolution
Phenomenology
existentialism
“Third”
scientific
revolution
Emergence
biotechnosciences
~25 Globalization ‘ “Fourth” 
biotechnological 
revolution (or biotech 
revolution proper)
Emergence of 
bioethics
The table indicates a number of important turning points (“revolutions”), the 
most important ones being a series of four ‘‘biotechnological revolutions'': dramatic 
shifts in the history of food production, namely the Neolithic revolution 
( *  10,000 years ago), the industrial revolution (* 2 5 0  years ago), the ‘‘green’’ 
revolution2 ( *  50 years ago) and, most recently, the biotech revolution based on the 
molecular life sciences and genomics. Beginning as a laboratory phenomenon 
focusing on micro-organisms in the 1970s, the biotech revolution spread to the 
outside world of plant breeding and food production from the 1990s onwards. For 
those who use the term “biotechnology” in a general sense, the Neolithic revolution 
represents the ‘‘first’’ biotechnological revolution. For those who use it in a stricter 
sense, there is only one biotech revolution and it occurred just a few decades ago.
While the term “biotechnology” is highly contentious, the term “revolution” is 
disputable in its own right. Rather than to a single eruptive event, the term refers to 
slowly emerging processes dispersed through time. The Neolithic revolution was 
certainly revolutionary in its impact, involving dramatic transformations of human 
life. Instead of gathering, hunting or fishing for their food, human beings now began
2 The dramatic increase of biomass in the 1950s and 1960s due to the introduction o f artificial fertilizers 
and pesticides, allowing food production to keep pace with worldwide population growth, but with 
disastrous environmental consequences.
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to produce it themselves, thus basically altering the trophodynamics of human 
existence. This has been seen as the dawning of human freedom by some, and as its 
downfall by others. But it was in reality, as far as historians can tell, a slowly 
evolving process rather than a sudden upheaval. The revolution proceeded ‘‘at an 
imperceptible pace’’ (Jones 2001, p. 94) and a thousand years after the first 
domesticated crops appeared, the affected landscapes were far from transformed, 
and hunter-gatherer communities were still wide-spread. In Europe the diffusion 
was ‘‘surprisingly discrete'' as well, with negligible impact upon its woodland 
canopy for millennia. Yet, it ‘‘changed the course of history forever’’ (Jones 2001, p. 
104). The agricultural pioneers who brought about the first biotechnological 
revolution probably did not see themselves as revolutionaries or as people living in a 
time of upheaval. Rather, we are the ones who retrospectively attach the term 
revolutionary to events that must have evolved much more gradually and tentatively 
that the research-driven transformations of our own time. The more recent the 
transformative event, the more sudden and revolutionary it appears.
The structure of this article is as follows. In the first sections, the most important 
events—the most important ‘‘cells’’ in the timetable above—will be briefly outlined. 
Notably, I will indicate why, until quite recently, agriculture, science, and 
philosophy (including ethics) developed virtually in complete isolation from one 
another. Four events will thus be highlighted: (a) the Neolithic revolution; (b) the 
first “scientific revolution” (i.e., the birth of Greek philosophy); (c) the Christian 
epoch, and (d) the ‘‘second'' scientific revolution (dawn of modern science). I will 
show how in modern times science, agriculture, and philosophy increasingly began 
to converge. Once the timetable has been sufficiently elucidated, I will proceed to 
explain how this historical backdrop may help us to understand and address the 
difficulties we experience when it comes to conceptually grasping the meaning of 
the two key terms of the current biotech debate, namely ‘‘biotechnology'' and 
‘‘naturalness.''
Expanding the Temporal Horizon: The Neolithic Revolution
Food is the essence of what we are (we are what we eat), but in order to really 
acknowledge its importance, philosophers must learn to think in terms of a different 
timeline, an expanded temporal horizon. For ancient Greek philosophy, time was 
experienced in terms of the present. Past and future did exist, but were never very 
distant. Greek culture suffered from a kind of myopia or temporal near-sightedness 
(Spengler 1918/1923, p. 10 ff). For nineteenth-century philosophers like Hegel or 
Nietzsche, history had become tremendously important, but only history in the sense 
of written history, covering a mere 1% at most of the narrative of Homo sapiens, 
and with a bias towards certain well-documented aspects of our culture. For 
contemporary philosophical debate, the temporal dimension has to increase 
significantly once more. The research into the Neolithic revolution, moreover, is 
subject to revolutionary change itself, due to the emergence of novel research 
practices that intend to bridge the traditional dichotomous gap between the 
‘‘sciences’’ (studying ‘‘nature’’) and the “humanities” (studying ‘‘culture’’), such as
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bioarchaeology (Jones 2001), environmental archaeology (Albarella 2001), human 
palaeoecology (Butzer 1982), and population genomics (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994/ 
1996). Analysis of cultural phenomena, ranging from language to art and artifacts, is 
increasingly complemented by ecological and genomics research concerning the 
history of genomes of humans, plants, and animals in the context of their ecological 
environments, while the inquiry into early human history is developing into the 
study of evolving ecosystems shaped and inhabited by humans. The following 
historical overview builds on these emerging sources.
The Neolithic revolution began *  10,000 years ago, more or less simultaneously 
in various parts of the world, in isolation from one another, such as Mesopotamia 
and Egypt, North and South China (along the Yellow and the Yangtze River), the 
Indus valley, West Africa (Fuller 2005), Mexico and the Andes highlands (Cavalli- 
Sforza 1993/1995). From there it gradually undulated into other environments, such 
as Europe. At various parts of the globe, the face of the earth began to change as 
human beings began to systematically modify their natural environments through 
wilderness clearing and reclamation. It was a moment of awakening, as it were, of 
mankind as a whole. The simultaneity of these worldwide changes suggests a 
common external factor in the form of global climate change (Cavalli-Sforza 2000/ 
2001, p. 97). As humans and animals found themselves united in their effort to 
circumvent post-glacial draught, former hunters became cultivators and domesti- 
cators in their retreating oases (Childe 1936). Every region involved produced its 
own typical domesticated plant form—a plant that gave the region in question an 
identity, a face, so to speak—making use of the wild types available: cereals in the 
Middle East, millet in the Northern parts of China, rice in South China, maize in 
Mexico. The civilizations concerned became wholly dependent upon a small 
number of key species (Jones 2001, p. 80). Eventually, around 5,000 years ago, 
extended parts of the world including China and Europe had become real agri­
cultures where agriculture flourished and constituted the basis of societal existence.
Indeed, when it comes to defining what is meant by the Neolithic revolution, 
agriculture is the key. It notably involved the cultivation of plant forms, the use of 
micro-organisms for processes such as fermentation, and the domestication of 
animals. Human existence changed from a nomadic life-style of hunting and 
gathering into a sedentary existence. Human beings began to settle down. It 
involved, in other words, a process of self-domestication (of ‘‘housing’’ ourselves). 
The large majority of mankind came to live in agricultural settlements—rural 
villages—where virtually everyone became directly involved in the process of food 
production with the help of agricultural contrivances and techniques (cultivation, 
domestication, fermentation, food preservation, etc.).
No ‘‘science'' was involved in this, at least not in the modern sense of the term, as 
formally tested, evidence-based knowledge. The knowledge of farmers applying 
biotechniques such as crop selection or fermentation was of a practical nature, 
transmitted in oral formats and often connected with animistic cosmologies—as is still 
apparent for instance in the pre-scientific term for alcohol: spiritus. It was only when 
Lavoisier outlined the chemical composition of what he termed ‘‘alcohol,’’ and, 
subsequently, when Pasteur elucidated the microbiology of fermentation, that the 
production of beverages such as beer and wine could become science-based and, as a
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consequence of that, industrialized. But human beings had been successfully developing 
and using fermentation and other techniques worldwide for millennia. Praxis (practical 
knowledge) preceded scientific inquiry stricto sensu. It was only in the context of the 
Industrial revolution that science and technology began to merge and fermentation 
became an evidence-based industrial practice rather than a domestic activity.
Thus, the CHP, emerging as a consequence of the Neolithic revolution, fared fairly 
well without science. Moreover, it was a form of life that affected virtually all 
dimensions of human existence. First of all, it gave rise to a population explosion, as 
the population level increased dramatically and exponentially (Childe 1936, p. 40; 
1942/1946, p. 59). Farmers could afford to support large families and agriculture made 
high birth rates both ‘‘feasible and desirable’’ (Cavalli-Sforza 1993/1995, p. 133). In 
comparison to the life-style of hunters and gatherers, the rural village offered a 
relatively protective environment, less physically challenging. Moreover, whereas 
hunters and gatherers formed bands and clans of limited size, the new existence 
encouraged the emergence of large-scale social structures, with cultivated rural 
regions centering around huge cities. Humans now rigorously controlled the way in 
which plants and animals developed and reproduced within plots that were under the 
sway of human action. Large and complex environments were created within 
controlled landscapes (Jones 2001, p. 80). Large groups of people were needed for 
irrigation projects or for cultivating wasteland areas. The land on which ‘‘the great 
cities of Babylonia were to rise had literally to be created'' (Childe 1936, p. 121). The 
small-scale group dynamics of nomadic clan life were replaced by more sophisticated 
forms of politics: the art of managing large numbers of people in extended regions— 
involving all the problems of long-distance governance, through developing new 
techniques of administration, and these not only included large-scale irrigation 
projects and construction projects (monuments, palaces, temples, city-walls, etc.), but 
also auxiliary crafts such as computation and writing. Computation was needed for 
regulating practices of storage, taxation, and distribution, for example, and writing 
emerged as a communication tool and as a mnemotechnique for information storage 
and exchange over large distances and between generations. Whole landscapes were 
‘‘domesticated’’ by means of technologies for water management (irrigation and flood 
control) through large-scale collaborative efforts. And every region involved not only 
developed its own typical plant form, but also coined its own type of script. Thus, the 
Neolithic revolution created three types of socio-spheres of increasing size, first of all 
the rural village (the Neolithic revolution stricto sensu), subsequently the regional city 
(the ‘‘urban’’ revolution, *5,000 years ago), and finally the emergence of empires 
encompassing a whole world within its sphere of influence (*2,500 years ago).
Thus, the Neolithic revolution provided the ecological foundation of the great 
civilizations that began to emerge in the ‘‘affected’’ regions (Jones 2001, p. 86). It was 
a ‘‘biotechnological’’ revolution that involved dramatic cultural changes, notably the 
development of new cognitive, social, and communicative skills. Social life became 
much more differentiated in terms of class and gender. In fact, social differences 
began to solidify into quasi-natural categories—and a host of social roles emerged, 
often associated with particular technologies and skills. Those not directly involved in 
producing food themselves, notably the elite in charge of managerial and governing 
tasks, became dependent on the surplus produced by farmers (Childe 1942/1946, p.
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62). Childe (1936) even goes so far as to argue that the Neolithic revolution that began 
in illiterate rural areas came to a standstill in the literate centers of the urban 
revolution it created, where concrete interactions with nature and accumulative 
technological improvements gave way to scholarly learning and metaphysical 
cosmology (p. 259). Be this as it may, food production was the decisive factor in 
determining the type of life human beings began to develop. The CHP as a way of life 
settled itself to such an extent that it came to be seen as our natural way of being-in-the 
world. At a certain point, it became difficult to imagine a different kind of life for 
humans. This is reflected, for instance, in the Bible Book Ecclesiastes. Mankind 
works and toils, on a seasonal basis, harvesting and sowing. To everything there is a 
season, everything and everyone has its proper place, nothing ever really changes, 
human existence has become fully stabilized into the ‘‘natural'' way of life.
Yet, at the same time, this ‘‘natural'' common pattern can be seen (from a 
biological and evolutionary perspective) as a deviation from nature, from the more 
or less natural forms of existence that had flourished ever since Homo sapiens came 
into this world. Historically speaking, the CHP merely covers 4% of human history. 
From an evolutionary (species) perspective it is an ‘‘unnatural’’ deviation, a cultural 
‘‘mutation,'' a new beginning. The CHP produced a new view of nature, in which 
everyone and everything occupies its natural place, a cosmology that not only 
reflected the new way of life, but also made it seem natural and therefore legitimate, 
as if nature and human existence had always been this way, and would always 
remain basically the same.
Why Food Production was not Always Regarded as an Issue 
of Philosophical Concern: The Birth of Philosophy
Twenty-five centuries ago (around 500 BC) another astonishing event took place: 
mankind was suddenly visited upon by a cultural mutation, an intellectual epidemic, 
the dawning of human self-consciousness. All of a sudden, the world began to think, 
to reflect (Jaspers 1949; Storig 1961). It affected the intellectual avant-garde at 
various locations more or less at the same time: Confucius (551-479) and Lao Tse 
in China were contemporaries, more or less, of Buddha in India (563-483), 
Jeremiah and Zoroaster in the Middle East, and of the early Greek philosophers such 
as Parmenides and Herakleitos (both born about 540 BC) in the West. As Jaspers 
and Storig argue, it is difficult to see this synchronicity, this global awakening at 
different locations more or less simultaneously and independently from one another, 
as sheer coincidence. Yet, the intellectual transformation did not involve a 
biotechnological or agricultural revolution. Mankind had already settled into its 
‘‘common’’ pattern. Neither Lao Tse, nor Buddha, nor Jeremiah, nor Parmenides 
came to revolutionize agriculture. What they developed was an ethico-philosophical 
stance towards the CHP as an omnipresent cultural environment, an attitude of 
detachment and equanimity. They preached a life of contemplation, in the center 
(Plato, Confucius) or in the folds and margins (Lao Tse, Herakleitos) of agro- 
technical societies, not a transformation of (agro)technology as such.
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In the context of this global awakening, ancient Greek philosophy and 
mathematics came into existence—a process of rationalization known as the ‘‘first'' 
scientific revolution. Mathematics became a rational endeavor based on formal 
proofs, rather than on computational techniques, as had been the case in the 
agricultural kingdoms of Mesopotamia and Egypt. Thus, a practical knowledge 
form became ‘‘science'' (Boyer 1968). Most ancient philosophers belonging to the 
first generations of ‘‘lovers'' and ‘‘teachers'' of wisdom were of aristocratic 
inclination, or even descent. They were not directly involved in the process of 
producing food and other life-sustaining products. Many of them were city-dwellers 
(that is: food consumers) or ‘‘masters,'' representing the estate managers section of 
society, preferring to live an idle life, despising manual labor, as well as those who 
were actively involved in working with their hands.3 These first philosophers were 
eager to leave the toils of agricultural labor to others, notably women, slaves, and 
rural farmers, as carriers of the CHP. This is reflected in their philosophy, which 
strived to remain ‘‘pure''—a philosophy of contemplation, not at all a reflection on 
worldly, mundane forms of existence, nor on concrete interactions with natural 
environments or with the forces and dynamics of nature. Rather, nature was seen as 
kosmos, a perfect order in which everything and everyone occupies a more or less 
natural position—with the gentleman-sage placing himself at the center of the 
universe.
The influence of these ancient ‘‘masters’’ on centuries of philosophical thinking 
has been tremendous and is still noticeable today. The basic theme of the ancient 
master-philosophers when it came to reflecting on food was temperance (Zwart 
2000, 2005). This is quite understandable, from the point of view of the ancient 
Greek (or Roman) ‘‘gentleman-philosopher.'' First of all, it is understandable that 
their focus was on consumption, rather than on production. Anything that was 
involved in food production was largely ignored by a philosophy of contemplation. 
Some managerial skills were involved in the management of human resources, no 
doubt, and master-philosophers like Plato and Aristotle were eager to point out why 
their supposedly more rational fellow-aristocrats could be entrusted with directing 
the lives of less rational and less autonomous individuals (such as women and 
slaves) that made up the bulk of the human work force of the day, but basically, 
food production was beyond their scope and sphere of interest. Food, from a Greek 
aristocratic point of view, and from the point of view of city-dwellers and surplus 
consumers such as Socrates or Diogenes the Cynic, basically meant food 
consumption. In the face of wealth and abundance, the mark of rationality and 
autonomy was temperance, the virtuous mean between two extremes, both of which 
were seen as not befitting a gentleman, namely deprivation and excess (Aristotle 
1926/1982; Cf. Foucault 1984a, b).
A significant part of the ethical discourse of ancient philosophy on food can thus 
be seen as iterations elaborating this one repetitive theme of temperance. Living a 
life of temperance was regarded as a way to safeguard one’s autonomy vis-a-vis 
bodily desires and, more importantly even, as a means of distinguishing oneself
3 According to Plato (1930/1999), those who provide food and whose strength o f body can be deployed 
for toil are an inevitable part o f the polis but ‘‘not worthy of our fellowship” (Republic, 371 D).
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from the anonymous majority of mankind—the many, hoi polloi. Food production 
was, quite literally, outside the ‘‘sphere’’ of aristocratic thinking. The things that 
occupied their minds were far removed from the worries of mundane and daily life. 
They developed a ‘‘platonic'' view on food—although Aristotle every now and then 
took up some of the more concrete issues, for instance by demonstrating, with the 
help of Greek mathematics, why aristocrats were entitled to consume a relatively 
large amount of material resources.4 In contrast to this, the ethic of small-scale 
hands-on rural agriculture was captured in other literary genres outside ‘‘high’’ 
philosophy, such as Aesop’s fables or fragments of poems and plays by ‘‘minor’’ 
authors, where the small farm is described as the most rightful property for us to 
own, gently yielding everything our human nature needs (Longo 2001).
To the extent that the emergence of rational thinking did have practical 
consequences, the impact was mainly on the political domain, placing the policies 
and technologies of administration on a more rational footing. Philosophers such as 
Plato, Aristotle, or Confucius were greatly interested in ethics and governance, and 
the intellectual revolution that they instigated would eventually stimulate the 
emergence of large-scale political entities, such as the Roman Empire and the Han 
Dynasty (202 BC-AD 220). Although they were highly influential as political 
philosophers, it was only indirectly, through politics, that their activities eventually 
affected the ways in which agriculture came to be organized.
Plato and Aristotle did have an interest in nature as such, but not in what we 
nowadays would call ‘‘applied'' research fields or anything resembling the 
contemporary biotechnosciences. Greek scientific thinking, like its counterpart in 
China, remained metaphysical cosmology: human existence, both individually and 
politically, was seen as embedded in a cosmological cyclical whole, a kosmos. 
Concepts like progress on the basis of technological development did not have a 
place in such a view. It entailed an ethic of equanimity rather than change. Their 
thinking conveyed the idea that mundane empires should reflect the harmony and 
stability of heavenly spheres, a pivotal source of inspiration for the construction of 
huge empires, large-scale political unities encompassing worlds rather than nations, 
based on agriculture. Meanwhile, the CHP basically remained what it was, 
undisrupted. Agricultural life continued to provide the ecological basis of life. And 
although agricultural technologies became more sophisticated and refined over time, 
they did so gradually and accumulatively and at a relatively slow pace, through 
verbal and informal practices of communication. As Childe (1942/1946) already 
indicated, from an early stage onwards, and in the West as well as in the East, the 
rural crafts of agriculture and the urban (elite) crafts of reading and writing became 
divorced, so that written history conveyed only a very patchy and incomplete record 
of societal history (p. 118/9). Only a limited number of knowledge forms became 
subject to writing, preferably those that were most ‘‘divorced from practical life,'' 
such as high philosophy and pure mathematics (1936, p. 213).5 Thus, the process of
4 Cf. his views on distributive justice: ‘‘[J]ustice involves [two persons and two shares]. I f  the persons are 
not equal, they will not have equal shares; it is when equals possess or are allotted unequal shares, or 
persons not equal equal shares, that quarrels and complaints arise’’ (Aristotle 1926/1982; V. iii. 6-8).
5 ‘‘In entering the school the pupil turned his back on plough and bench ... Learned men were apt to turn 
to books in preference to nature’’ (Childe 1936, p. 213).
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rationalization by the enlightened elite affected mathematics and cosmology more 
than biotechnology and agriculture. Academic disciplines tended to be of a lofty 
nature. Although they included interest in managerial issues, the world of food 
production was taken for granted. For centuries to come, the CHP remained more or 
less in place.
The focus on the elitist theme of temperance does not make these ancient views 
and ideas about food irrelevant, but we must place them in their proper historical 
perspective. Contemporary philosophy can no longer afford to ignore issues 
involved in food production. By allowing food—notably its production—to occupy 
a central place on our agendas, we as philosophers of the present emphatically 
distance ourselves from our aristocratic predecessors of long ago. Not by discarding 
ancient Greek philosophy altogether, but rather by seeing it as a particular position 
in the context of a long-winded historical drama of doing and thinking with regard 
to food. Until recently, however, Greek philosophy was seen, not as a mere chapter 
in the history of thought, but rather as its true beginning, setting a standard for 
philosophers of later times. In order to understand the present, it became established 
practice, notably among continental philosophers, to use the ancient world, 
exemplified by the writings of philosophers like Plato, as a critical mirror.
That is why, in order to clarify the meaning of food in human life, we have to 
take the historical exercise much further, developing a more extended view on 
human history. Philosophy as a discipline has to undergo a significant increase of 
scale. The true beginning for a ‘‘history of the present,'' the real origin of the 
processes that eventually gave rise to the here and now, is not the dawning of the 
rationalistic worldview around 500 B C., but rather the Neolithic revolution that 
occurred millennia before that time, opening up some of the crucial dimensions that 
have characterized human existence ever since, such as agriculture, writing, and 
politics. The Neolithic revolution resulted in the emergence of the CHP as a way of 
being that was more or less seen as natural and given by the master-philosophers of 
ancient Greece. For them, this form of life was simply ‘‘there,'' and this allowed 
them to virtually ignore its material aspects in their philosophies. They could afford 
to leave their slaves and laborers chained to their cave-like existence of daily toil, 
while they themselves indulged (in their gardens and sport facilities) in reflections 
on the place of friendship, temperance, and contemplation in what, undoubtedly, 
must have been a very good life.
Christianization: On Metaphysics Becoming Natural
An important document that contains a concise account of the Neolithic revolution 
is the Bible Book Genesis, either in its original version or in more recent adaptations 
such as John Milton's Paradise Lost. Initially, mankind leads a life of gathering and 
leisure, and human existence has not yet evolved into a sedentary way of being. The 
first humans roam about without a fixed dwelling place, but as soon as their 
proverbial Paradise is lost and they are banished from Eden, the world dramatically 
changes overnight. They have to leave their ‘‘native soil'' with its ‘‘walks and 
shades,'' its beautiful flowers and pleasant climate, in order to migrate into a
Ö  Springer
Biotechnology and naturalness in the genomics era 517
seemingly unfriendly landscape where toilsome labor awaits them—where ‘‘the 
field to labor calls us now,’’ as Milton phrases it (1962, Book XI, 171-172) and 
where they have to ‘‘till the ground’’ (261) in a world that is obscure, wild, 
inhospitable, and desolate (306). Eventually, however, fields, villages, and cities 
emerge in this landscape, and human beings multiply (XI, 17).
Interestingly, while the Neolithic revolution is depicted as punishment in 
Genesis, modern authors such as Kant (1786/1971), and to a certain extent Milton, 
suggest that it was in fact a liberation, the beginning of the true history of mankind. 
In Paradise the first humans more or less still lived the life of ‘‘human animals,'' 
passive consumers, not yet responsible for the production of their own food. The 
debate between rational humanists such as Kant, seeing the emigration out of Eden 
as the dawning of human freedom, and Romantic counterparts such as Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, rather interpreting it as the beginning of enslavement, still continues and 
there is an element of truth in both accounts. By becoming food producers, human 
beings emancipated themselves from their dependence of natural resources. On the 
other hand, the Neolithic revolution gave rise to social differentiation and the 
emergence of phenomena such as class, property, and division of labor. Social 
stratifications assumed the status of ‘‘natural'' social categories embedded in the 
CHP and supported by metaphysical cosmology.
As Karl Jaspers rightly pointed out, there was no technology, let alone 
‘‘biotechnology,’’ in Paradise (1949, p. 153). The escape from Eden coincided with 
its emergence. From now on, mankind labored and toiled to produce edible cereals, 
as the earth herself brought forth only thorns and thistles. And this involved 
cognitive activities such as planning and calculating. Adam, Eve, and their sons 
became active in farming and animal husbandry, producing their own food through 
cultivation and domestication. A dramatic population increase resulted: mankind 
began to multiply exponentially, encouraged by God Himself to be fruitful, to 
multiply, to bring forth abundantly. Beget children, raise cattle, multiply! was God’s 
basic moral maxim in Genesis. Cities like Babel came into existence, involving 
large-scale collective efforts, notably in the sphere of architecture (albeit apparently 
not very successful in the beginning due to problems of communication and 
governance of human resources). The majority of human beings, however, like 
Abraham and his clan, lived a rural life, as animal domesticators or crop cultivators. 
The Bible as a whole describes how, after an initial period of conflict and drama, the 
agricultural life-style (CHP) gradually stabilizes itself. Mankind as such becomes 
domesticated as it were. In the Gospels, agricultural existence, a life of sowing and 
harvesting, of preserving (notably through fermentation) and distributing food, is 
the inevitable way of being-in-the world for mankind. The Roman Empire 
introduces new techniques of power, based on monetary systems, civil legislation, 
road building, and tax paying, but the daily world of agriculture is hardly affected.
Christianity came to play a important role in the history of producing and 
processing food during the ‘‘medieval'' period, when monastic orders combined an 
interest in Aristotelian cosmology with systematic programs for agricultural 
enhancement. After the Fall, the natural way of life had to be restored by well- 
organized stewardship through self-discipline and labor. Monastic orders had a 
tremendous impact on the development of biotechnologies and landscape
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transformation, from Saint Benedict (480-547) in the early Middle Ages up to the 
era of Gregor Mendel (1822-1884). They were responsible for programs of 
cultivation, reclamation, and wilderness clearing, but also for developing new 
techniques for fermentation and food processing, as well as for developing 
disciplined and methodical lifestyles, much more disciplined than the behavioral 
patterns that flourished in rural environments. Thus, monastic orders played a key 
role in bringing about the population growth in Europe during the second half of the 
Middle Ages when agricultural innovations began to reverse the economic decay 
that had followed the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. Yet, even more 
dramatic has been the impact of the modern sciences that came into existence during 
the so-called ‘‘second scientific revolution.
Scientific Revolutions: The Convergence of Agriculture and Science
Rather than with mundane realities, ancient Greek philosophy and mathematics had 
been occupied with ideal objects of contemplation. ‘‘Real ’ ’ science— scientia 
experim ental—began somewhere between the fourteenth and the seventeenth 
century. A drawback of the sudden dramatic ‘‘leap ’’ (Jaspers 1949) of ancient Greek 
thinking into science had been that the practical and material realms of life were 
eclipsed and by-passed more or less. Many centuries later, the German philosopher 
Hegel in a famous passage in his Phenomenology o f the Spirit indicated that, in 
order to acquire real knowledge about the natural world, one has to leave the 
position of the master, the position of idleness—merely contemplating and 
idealizing nature—in order to become really, actively, and interactively involved 
with nature (1807/1973, pp. 145-154)—for instance by designing and conducting 
experiments—thinking with your hands, using contrivances and tools in order to 
force nature to reveal her secrets, thus acquiring real power over nature—the 
modern ‘‘Faustian ’’ power to modify natural processes.
Initially, the ‘‘second’’ scientific revolution6 assumed an academic profile 
comparable to the first. Yet, from the very onset, it involved a much more active 
stance towards nature, due to the fact that its core idea was that of conducting an 
experiment. In the context of an experimental trial, manipulation precedes 
observation. In ancient Greece, observation of natural phenomena had been 
connected with reverence and wonder, but modern researchers began to interact in a 
less respectful and more manipulative vein with objects of research. The guiding 
idea of the second scientific revolution was that nature can best be understood 
through manipulation, while a better understanding will allow us to modify and
6 The terms ‘‘first’ ’ and ‘‘second’’ scientific revolution ( ‘‘Revolution der Denkart ’’ ) were introduced by 
Kant (1781/1975) in the Introduction to the second edition of his Critique o f Pure Reason. The second 
revolution began in astronomy as the ‘‘Copernican revolution (Copernicus, Galileo) and spread from 
there to physics (Newton, Boyle) and chemistry (Lavoisier). It relied on the introduction o f new 
contrivances and tools (such as microscope, etc.) and its basic idea was that of conducting an experiment, 
that is, the idea that manipulation, rather than passive observation, leads to knowledge. It can be argued, 
however, that the Scientia experimentalis originated much earlier, in the fourteenth century, with the work 
of Roger Bacon, Cusanus, and others (Spengler 1918/1923).
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master life and matter more effectively. The new sciences were motivated by a Will 
to Power, to use the Nietzschean phrase. This became clear as the new knowledge 
began to migrate from contained environments such as private academies and small- 
scale laboratories into the real world of labor and productivity. In the course of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, modern science began to change the human 
world dramatically, notably the world of human labor. This coincided with a 
dramatic population increase, one that equaled the increase associated with the 
Neolithic revolution (Childe 1936), and eventually led to a profound disruption of 
the CHP. The surplus population of rural areas began to migrate from rural 
environments into the quickly expanding industrial cities, constituting a new type of 
human beings, the labor force in the form of the urban human ‘‘masses. Books like 
Das Kapital by Karl Marx and Surveiller et Punirby Michel Foucault (1975) can be 
seen as efforts to describe the transformation of rural populations into the ‘‘labor 
force, ’ ’ the ‘‘human resources ’’ of modern industrial times.
The basic disruption consisted in the fact that, from now on, the majority of 
individuals was no longer directly involved in the process of food production. The 
two basic dimensions of food, namely production and consumption, became 
disconnected. The urban masses, as food ‘‘consumers, became increasingly 
dependent on industrial food ‘‘producers, and on novel food products produced by 
the food industry on a science-based footing. Beer, bread, butter, and meat 
dramatically changed from home-made entities into industrial products—into 
commodities (Zwart 2005). Producers no longer produced products for their 
neighbors or themselves, but rather for a market of abstract, anonymous consumers, 
in competition with rival producers. According to Romein and Romein-Verschoor 
(1954), the industrial revolution constituted a real deviation from the CHP as it had 
existed so far, placing Europe in an exceptional position in comparison to other 
regions of the world, notably Asia (Romein 1956), where the CHP continued to 
exist for quite some time.
In the context of this deviation, human life changed in other ways as well. Time, as 
a basic dimension of human existence, suddenly changed. As Karl Marx explained in 
Capital (1867/1906), the working day no longer coincided with a ‘‘natural ’’ day— 
‘‘natural in the context of the CHP. From now on, it could be quantified and 
objectified—defined in term of exact time indicators such as hours and minutes, 
rather than in more ‘‘natural terms such as sunrise or sunset. Time itself became 
modifiable and negotiable as it were, a variable quantity (pp. 256-257). The 
‘‘natural distinction between day and night became obsolete and had to be replaced 
by an exact definition of what constitutes a working day, by a negotiable demarcation 
between productive and reproductive time—as well as between the context of food 
production (in factories) and the context of food consumption (in urban domestic 
environments). As Marx describes in Chapter 8 of his famous book, fierce struggles 
evolved over the definition of a ‘‘natural working day. Initially, it was said to 
contain twelve hours. At a certain point, however, factory owners managed to extend 
it to sixteen hours. The labor movement protested against such a violent transgression 
of ‘‘natural ’ ’ restrictions on the exploitation of bodily resources and eventually, it was 
reduced to eight hours. Yet, the awareness that temporal demarcations are arbitrary in 
principle and open to negotiation became a fact of life.
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Finally, the twentieth century has been regarded, and rightly so, as the stage setting 
of the ‘‘third’ ’ scientific revolution, studying the building blocks of matter and life, 
beginning around 1900 in physics (the quantum concept, quantum physics, theory of 
relativity, etc.) as well as in genetics, spreading from there to chemistry and computer 
science and converging into the life sciences around the middle of the century 
(Schrodinger 1944; Watson and Crick 1953). In various ways the ‘‘third ’’ scientific 
revolution (resulting in nuclear physics on the one hand and in biotechnology as its 
biological counterpart on the other) has affected our views and practices concerning 
the production and consumption of food. Within decades, it has given rise to 
transformations that are generally regarded as revolutionary. As Jaspers argued, the 
introduction of nuclear power, as the most visible and tangible outcome of the ‘‘new ’ ’ 
physics that emerged during the first decades of the Twentieth Century, was a second 
“Promethean ’’ revolution, comparable in historical significance to the invention of 
fire and everything this implied for the process of anthropogenesis, the coming into 
being of mankind. The Promethean revolution notably gave rise to pyrotechnology as 
a primeval form of environment management (forest clearance, hunting practices, 
nomadic agriculture, etc.) that dominated human existence for millennia (Moore 
2001). The biotech revolution that occurred during the final decades of the century 
was rather the counterpart of the Neolithic revolution.
The biotech revolution in a strict sense was preceded by the so-called ‘‘Green ’ ’ or 
biochemical revolution (the ‘‘third biotechnological revolution) emerging in the 
wake of World War II and involving the introduction of herbicides and artificial 
fertilizers, thereby significantly boosting agricultural production levels to unprec­
edented heights, in order to keep pace with the global population explosion that was 
already taking place at that time (Conway 1998). The subsequent transformation 
known as the biotech revolution affects both ends of the food chain: production as 
well as consumption. In the context of food production it resulted in the introduction 
of genetically modified crops, produced for a global food market, where the distance 
between production and consumption increases dramatically. In the context of food 
consumption, consumer ‘‘empowerment has become an important issue: the idea of 
allowing individual consumers to manage their own health and to develop their own 
consumer identity, on the basis of labeling and (evidence-based) information, even 
allowing producers and consumers to tailor food products to consumer genomes on 
the basis of an improved understanding of how food affects and interacts with our 
bodies and our genomes. In order to put these latter developments in their proper 
context, and to understand the normative controversies that have erupted, the 
historical backdrop outlined above will prove of pivotal importance. In the 
following sections, I will first discuss the role of ‘‘biotechnology in the context of 
contemporary food production. Next, I will discuss the role of ‘‘naturalness in the 
context of contemporary food consumption.
Biotechnology and its Discontents: Transformation of Food Production
As was indicated, two apparently incompatible narratives concerning the role of 
biotechnology in food production evolved. The first one emphasizes continuity,
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arguing that food production (cultivation of plant forms, ‘‘domestication of micro­
organisms such as yeast, etc.) began millennia ago. Humans have been modifying 
and domesticating life forms ever since the Neolithic. The current biotech 
revolution is yet another chapter in an on-going story. The second narrative 
emphasizes that there is something fundamentally new and unprecedented—or even 
uncanny -, about the new technologies of life: they are providing us with 
fundamentally new forms of biopower. While the first narrative is often propagated 
by scientists and biotechnology experts (cf. Henry Miller 2007), the second one 
tends to be disseminated by biotech critics such as Jeremy Rifkin, a prominent 
protagonist of the discontinuity-thesis, notably in his now classic book The Biotech 
Century (1998/1999) that can be regarded as representative of (setting the standard 
for) the discontinuity discourse.
Although Rifkin is of course clearly aware of the fact that humans have been 
modifying life forms ever since time immemorial, he nonetheless vehemently argues 
that biotech confronts us with unprecedented challenges. According to Rifkin, global 
agriculture finds itself ‘‘in the midst of a great transition in world history (p. 2), one 
that ‘‘raises more troubling issues than any other revolution in history ’ ’ (p. xiii). Our 
way of life is likely to be more fundamentally transformed in the next several decades 
or so than in the previous one thousand years (p. 1). Eventually the new revolution may 
lead to ‘‘the elimination of the agricultural era that stretched from the Neolithic 
revolution some ten thousand years ago to the green revolution of the latter half of the 
century’ ’ (p. 2). The ability to isolate, identify, and recombine genes is making the 
gene pool available, for the first time, as primary raw resource. That means that we are 
now ‘‘really and effectively manipulating living materials. Biotech represents an 
abrupt deviation from the way of life that has existed for millennia: ‘‘In little more than 
a generation, our definition of life and the meaning of existence is likely to be radically 
altered. Long-held assumptions about nature, including our own human nature, are 
likely to be rethought (p. 1). Indeed, according to Rifkin, biotech constitutes ‘‘the 
most radical experiment humankind has ever carried out on the natural world ’ ’ (p. x). It 
constitutes a ‘‘re-seeding of the world, a laboratory-conceived second Genesis (p. 
67). Eventually, it is bound to lead to a biological Tower of Babel, spreading chaos 
throughout the biological world and drowning out the ancient languages of evolution 
(p. 70). And although Rifkin acknowledges that human beings have been remaking the 
Earth ‘‘for as long as we have had a history, up to now our ability to re-create nature 
has been tempered by natural restraints, such as species boundaries. In the course of a 
long historical process of tinkering and trial and error, nature continued to dictate the 
terms of the engagement. But the technologies of the genetic age allow scientists to 
manipulate the world at the most fundamental level. A radical scientific experiment, 
using the global environment as its test-bed, is underway.
Thus, in order to come to terms with the current revolution, Rifkin s historical 
point of reference is the Neolithic transition, notably as depicted in Genesis. Rifkin 
figures as prophet who literally depicts the revolution as a second Genesis. Natural 
genomes (the basic outcome of Genesis One) have now become raw materials. 
Moreover, biotech is not the work of individual scientists, but rather evolves 
through large-scale networks, involving many experts worldwide, that have to be 
administered, governed and monitored. These large-scale enterprises will change
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the societal landscape as well. As has been the case during the ‘‘first 
biotechnological revolution, agro-cultural developments are bound to significantly 
affect society at large. For Rifkin in his role as prophet, these developments will 
inevitably result in a second Babel, in a series of catastrophic events, a global 
cataclysm of truly biblical proportions—indeed, he predicts worldwide poverty, 
infectious diseases, environmental deterioration, and similar apocalyptical disasters.
Yet, for those who prefer to think of contemporary biotech as a continuation and 
miniaturization of previous human interactions with nature, a rival but perhaps 
equally compelling view may be developed on the basis of the same ideas.
10,000 years ago, the Neolithic revolution already constituted an experiment with 
nature in its own right, initially at local levels (notably alongside large rivers) but 
eventually on a global scale, greatly affecting flora and fauna worldwide. To ask 
ourselves how we, retrospectively, assess this event seems an almost impossible 
question to ask, if only because human culture as such— and this includes activities 
such as scholarly communication and writing biophilosophical articles—would have 
been unthinkable without it. It would more or less amount to asking ourselves 
whether we appreciate the fact that we exist at all. Without it, human life would look 
radically different, if only in terms of the number of people that would be able to 
maintain themselves. The Neolithic revolution has had dramatic consequences for 
human existence, as well as for life on Earth more generally, and this will go for the 
current biotech revolution as well. This does not mean that we should abstain from 
moving in this direction altogether, if it would at all be possible for such a 
‘‘decision ’ ’ to be made. In the case of previous revolutions, such as the Neolithic and 
the Industrial one, one could argue that initial stages of drama, confusion, and 
conflict (beginning with the trauma of Babel) eventually gave way to normalization, 
stabilization, and progress, during which new technologies became ‘‘domesticated 
as it were, and a ‘‘common’’ pattern, manageable in principle, established itself.7 
And this same logic may apply to the most recent stage in the history of 
biotechnology as well. As Cavalli-Sforza argues, genetics was invented during the 
Neolithic revolution, but reinvented in the twentieth century, by making once again 
a ‘‘giant leap forward ’’ in the power to modify organisms (1993/1995, p. 262). After 
a period of dramatic intrusion of technologies that are rightfully seen as uncanny 
and new, a new balance may set in, a new epoch of domestication. Yet, if we take 
the comparison with the Neolithic revolution seriously, it is unlikely that this will be 
a spontaneous process. Rather, it will call for active governance and deliberation.
Food Consumption and the Quest for Natural Food
We are what we eat. This first of all applies to the Neolithic styles of food production 
that created the CHP as a quasi-natural form of life. But the famous quote remains 
valid in the more recent past. Patterns of food consumption allow us to assume 
particular social and cultural identities. As was already indicated, in the course of the 
industrial revolution, special food products were developed especially for the urban
7 Thus biotechnology (in a general sense) gave rise a social dynamics that was more or less similar to the 
‘‘punctuated equilibrium ’ ’ o f biological evolution.
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masses (meat extracts, margarine, canned meat, factory bread, etc.). By consuming 
these products, consumers demonstrated their adherence to a particular class (Zwart 
2005), but it was not a matter of free choice. The link between food products and social 
identify was pre-established. In the metropolises (mother-cities) of the present, 
however, this is changing. Food is not only abundantly available, but we are 
confronted with a proliferation of food products from all corners of the earth. This sets 
the stage for the development of new identities, in other words: for consumer 
empowerment, for new practices of identity-formation and self-constitution through 
consumer choices. Choosing to consume or not to consume certain food products, for 
instance because they contain genetically modified ingredients, or meat, or products 
produced through child labor, allows us to position ourselves politically, and to 
assume a moral identity.
An intriguing phenomenon in this context is the consumer demand for ‘‘natural 
food. In ancient times, philosophers like Aristotle gave voice to the idea that the 
good life is a life ‘‘in accordance with nature, ’ ’ He did not mean by that a life close 
to nature in the rustic or Romantic sense. For Aristotle, the natural life was one of 
equanimity and harmony, the life of the gentleman-sage, of detachment, as far 
removed as possible from concrete interactions with nature and a rural existence, 
toiling for one s daily bread. In contemporary debates on food consumption, 
‘‘natural still tends to be equated with ‘‘good by many, but what do we mean by 
it? Concepts such as ‘‘nature’’ and ‘‘natural ’’ have become notoriously problematic. 
One of the problems is that these concepts can easily be abused, for instance by 
presenting certain forms of social or gender inequality as ‘‘natural. ’ ’
Against the backdrop of our timetable we may distinguish between three 
incommensurbale interpretations of ‘‘nature or ‘‘natural. The interpretation that 
emerged in the context of the CHP differs from the interpretation brought forward 
by ancient Greek philosophers (notably Aristotle) and even more so from more 
recent scientific interpretations. If the CHP is regarded as the ‘‘natural way of 
being for humans, everything that is part of this way of being-in-the world is bound 
to be seen as ‘‘natural. ’ ’ In the case of Aristotle, however, the concept of the 
‘‘natural was embedded in ancient Greek cosmology, the vision of the world as a 
perfect order. Finally, in the scientific interpretation, anything that is disclosed by 
scientific research, be it evolution or the functioning of genes, is ‘‘natural. ’ ’ Let me 
elaborate this somewhat further.
In many debates about food, the CHP still functions as a basic frame of reference 
when it comes to defining what should count as the natural life. In Tolstoy s great 
novel Anna Karenina (1878/1984), city-dwellers seem to revivify when they allow 
themselves to adopt and endorse a more ‘‘natural, that is: agricultural form of life, 
tilling the soil and consuming ‘‘natural food. Apparently, this is what human life is 
meant to be, how human beings were meant to live. From a CHP perspective, while 
traditional forms of crop cultivation (based on selection and hybridization) are 
regarded as ‘‘natural, genetic manipulation (taking place in high tech laboratories 
rather than in rural domestic environments) will be regarded as deviant. The CHP 
also gave rise to other ideas about naturalness, such as the idea of a natural division 
of labor among the sexes as well as the idea of a natural working day and a natural 
life-span for human beings—in short the idea that, to everything, there is a season.
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A similar tension troubles the debate concerning the naturalness (or integrity) of 
domestic animals. What do we mean when we say that in the context of animal 
husbandry for instance, animals should be treated in such a way as to permit them to 
behave naturally? As Segerdahl (2007) has argued, natural behavior of farm animals 
is not a ‘‘biological concept, since from a biological point of view the animals 
behavior has already been changed through domestication. Rather, naturalness is 
part of a normative ideal that favors animal-caretaker interactions as it emerges in 
traditional rural settings over the living conditions of domestic animals in the 
context of evidence-based production and intensive farming (‘‘factory farms ).
This is in many respects a different kind of naturalness than Aristotle had in 
mind. For him, the natural order of things was connected with metaphysical 
cosmology, notably the idea of the world as a Korioc; in which everyone and 
everything has (or strives to reach) its natural place. According to Aristotle, this 
universal order should be reflected in politics and ethics as well, resulting in the 
conviction that slavery and various other forms of social inequality should be 
regarded as ‘‘natural. ’ ’ It was, so to speak, a top-down view on nature through which 
the gentleman-sage explicitly distanced himself from views of nature that tended to 
be connected with concrete interactions with nature—bottom-up views, based on 
concrete rural experiences rather than on detached reflections. This may well 
explain why in politics and (biomedical) ethics, naturalness as an Aristotelian norm 
has been loosing terrain, while in the areas such as food ethics and environmental 
ethics, naturalness (in the sense of: closeness to nature, placing high value on 
concrete interactions with nature such as biological farming or hiking) is still 
regarded by many as a viable argument. Here, the idea of naturalness seems more 
grounded in practical life, corresponding to the CHP. Although this type of life has 
been disrupted by a series of technological transformations, the ideas connected 
with it still seem to retain something of their attractiveness to many—also because, 
as a countervailing force vis-a-vis rationalization and industrialization, the 
Romantic movement represented by Rousseau, Tolstoy, and others tended to 
idealize the CHP when they compared it the tensions of modern urban life—notably 
the estrangement from food production.
The most powerful iconoclastic destroyer of such conceptions of naturalness, 
connected with memories and images from disappearing worlds, are the biotechno­
sciences. As a rule, when scientists speak about nature, they neither refer to the 
metaphysical cosmology of Aristotle, nor to the domesticated rural nature of CHP 
existence, but rather to nature in a biologistic sense (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
1999). For them, nature basically means Palaeolithic nature. From this perspective, 
Neolithic life-styles already constitute a deviation from the natural form of existence 
as the outcome of biological evolution. The rural village already constituted a post­
natural world, a biotechnological artifact, where interaction with nature was based on 
manipulation (crop cultivation, hybridization, fermentation, etc.).
This explains why, whereas lay publics often tend to see genetic modification as 
‘‘unnatural ’’ —a view that retains some of the logic of the CHP as a natural form of 
life—many biotechnoscientists will argue, first of all, that biotechnology simply 
makes use of processes that nature herself has developed in the course of evolution 
and, secondly, that insofar as biotechnology is unnatural, mankind has been
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manipulating nature since time immemorial, so that genetic modification ‘‘merely 
constitutes an acceleration and refinement of more traditional forms of cultivation. 
Thus, a substantial part of public debate on genetic modification and other forms of 
biotechnology can be regarded as a clash between incommensurable visions of 
nature that emerged in various contexts in the course of history. Insofar as 
‘‘Palaeolithic ’’ or ‘‘biological ’’ nature is regarded as natural, as many scientists tend 
to do, it is difficult to see how nature can provide norms or normative guidance. In 
primal nature, anything seemed allowed insofar as competitiveness is furthered.
Neolithic nature, on the other hand, already refers to a particular form of human life, 
a particular form of embedding existence in nature. This vision, therefore, already 
entails a normative dimension, a view (at least in broad outline) on the good (that is, 
the ‘‘natural ) life— although not natural in the biological sense of the term. Indeed, 
from a ‘‘biologistic perspective, the CHP already constitutes a deviation. And it is no 
coincidence, of course, that as soon as the CHP was disrupted by the process of 
industrialization, a new, Darwinian and neo-Palaeolithic vision of nature emerged, 
based on the idea of competition for limited resources and scarce opportunities—in 
other words a view of nature that was tailored to human life as it was emerging in the 
context of industrial society. And this explains why critics of industrialization, such as 
Tolstoy, argued that the new form of life implied an intrusion or deviation, an 
‘‘unnatural ’ ’ form of existence. Neolithic life can likewise be regarded as unnatural, 
however, in the sense that it is a cultivated, domesticated form of life, the outcome of a 
series of rather consequential techno-cultural developments. Strictly speaking, it is a 
deviation from Palaeolithic behavioral patterns as outcomes of our biological 
evolution, equipping us for a life of gathering and hunting rather than farming. In 
biological terms, our Palaeolithic genome prepared us for a very different kind of life 
than we are living, also when it comes to food intake. Exposed to a ‘‘Neolithic 
lifestyles (cereals intake in combination with sedentary behavior), our bodies (as 
carriers of ‘‘Palaeolithic ’ ’ DNA) may develop a number of problems.
Palaeolithic Genomes and Neolithic Life-Styles
Genomics research, notably nutrigenomics, is now claiming that the Neolithic food 
practices that established themselves in large parts of the world between *  10,000 
and *  5,000 years ago constitute a deviation from the ‘‘natural ’ ’ human pattern (in a 
biological sense of the term) that existed for, say, 96% of human history. Therefore, 
the food products generated by ‘‘deviant Neolithic production forms are not in 
accordance with what biologically speaking may be regarded as our natural diet. 
Although it seems ‘‘natural (from a CHP perspective) to consume our ‘‘daily bread, 
this may not be true for humans as a biological species. In principle the new food 
products that emerged in the context of the CHP were not tailored to our genomes. A 
tension was thus introduced between Palaeolithic genomes and Neolithic life-styles, 
between our genomes as the outcome of our biological evolution and technology- 
based food regimes as the outcome of techno-cultural developments. The fit between 
diet and genome was from now on far from perfect.
1  n
526 H. Zwart
Nutrigenomics studies the way in which our genome responds to Neolithic and 
post-Neolithic forms of food intake. Due to the slowness of biological evolution in 
comparison to the exponential pace of cultural change, our genome has by and large 
remained a Palaeolithic one. In Palaeolithic environments, food was often unsafe no 
doubt, containing microbial or other contaminants, and often scarce, dependent on 
seasonal fluctuations. Yet, it was (biologically speaking) our natural diet. Modern 
agricultural environments provide food products that are usually safe and, in most 
parts of the world at least, abundantly available. They are rich in terms of calories, but 
often poor in terms of nutrients. During the Neolithic food regime, the range of food 
ingredients tended to decrease, as consumers became increasingly dependent on one 
particular core product (such as rice, wheat, maize, or potatoes). The ‘‘estrangement 
between Neolithic diets and Palaeolithic genomes has been causing an impressive 
series of so-called ‘‘cultural health problems, ranging from obesity and diabetes to 
cardiovascular disease (notably Coronary artery disease or CAD) and colon cancer 
(Eaton and Konner 1983; Cordain 2002; Cordain and Eaton 2005; Muskiet 2005). 
Obesity especially has been framed as a typically Neolithic health problem, arising 
from consuming large quantities of cereals and other food products made available by 
agricultural technologies, in combination with the Neolithic habit of settling down, of 
becoming sedentary, of ‘‘housing ’’ ourselves, thereby gaining weight. The French 
novelist Rabelais has immortalized the popular, agricultural ideals of the Neolithic 
revolution in the form of obese, gluttonous, heavyweight giants, Gargantua and 
Pantagruel. In this bodily ideal, obesity is more or less identified with health and 
fertility and Rabelais s archetypical giants are icons of a popular literary tradition of 
long standing, glorifying a rural and agricultural form of life. Yet, in an era in which 
the physical condition of human resources, notably the ‘‘lower classes, ’ ’ is once again 
becoming an economical issue of concern, notably in the face of an ‘‘obesity 
epidemic, ’ ’ the valuation of fatness has changed (Zwart 2007).
Furthermore, Neolithic diets contain ingredients that (at least for some consumers), 
are difficult to digest, such as gluten. Gluten intolerance, or Celiac Disease, is again a 
Neolithic health problem. Although the problem emerged *  10,000 years ago, it was 
only identified as such quite recently. Through genomics we begin to understand what 
we have been doing, during the past millennia, to our bodies and digestive systems by 
adopting Neolithic life-styles. Collaboration of genomics researchers with archaeol­
ogists may perhaps lead to a Renaissance of Palaeolithic food products so that our 
future diets become increasingly trans-Neolithic, re-tailored to our genomes. The 
weakness of this view is that it sees the human genome as stable and inflexible rather 
than plastic and responsive, whereas human life and health must be regarded as the 
outcome of a complex interaction between genome, lifestyle, and environment. 
‘‘Epigenomics is studying the ways in which actual lifestyles are affecting our 
genome, which continues to change and respond, even during our individual life.
Concluding Remarks
While the Industrial revolution ‘‘estranged the urban masses from the process of 
food production, the Neolithic revolution was already a deviation from our
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‘‘natural ’ ’ form of existence in the biologistic sense of the term. A nomadic life-style 
gave way to a sedentary one, producing different kinds of food products than had 
been naturally available. Yet, an intimate relationship was established between 
production and consumption. The majority of rural consumers were now intensively 
involved in producing their own food, as well as the surplus resources consumed by 
the urban and aristocratic elite (sections of society from which philosophers tended 
to be recruited). This social stratification explains why ancient philosophers tended 
not to pay much attention to the significance of food production for understanding 
key features of human existence. Although highlights of ancient philosophy 
emerged in the context of meals (symposia), even then the focus was on food 
consumption rather than production.
The Industrial revolution undermined the intimate relationship that had existed in 
rural environments for millennia between food production and consumption. Europe 
deviated from the CHP that had established itself almost globally—as Palaeolithic 
life-styles only managed to maintain themselves under exceptional climatologic 
conditions (such as exist in Australian deserts or African rain forests). In the West, 
urban masses became increasingly dependent on industrial food producers, so that 
restoring consumer autonomy through labeling policies became a major issue of 
concern. In contemporary societies, food consumption has become a matter of self­
constitution and identity-formation for the many. To a certain extent, it is now up to 
individuals themselves which idea of embodiment they want to express in their own 
food practices. They may develop particular forms of consumer behavior in order to 
position themselves in the context of societal debates, for instance on the moral 
appropriateness of bioindustrial animal husbandry, or on sustainability and global 
fairness. Thus, ideally, consumers may once again regain some level of influence 
over the food production process.
On the other hand, we see a widening of the gap between production and 
consumption on a globalizing market. Rather than a ‘‘global village, ’ ’ where 
consumers may once again regain control over their own food intake, the global 
mother-city may become a place where biotechnosciences generate food products 
that defy rather than facilitate consumer involvement. Rather than providing 
opportunities for participation, consumers may feel increasingly disenfranchised 
(Lien and Anthony 2007, p. 413). The Industrial revolution had allowed the West to 
deviate considerably from the CHP. As a consequence, whereas Europe and China, 
for example, were still remarkably similar in medieval times, modern Europe was 
exceptional, as Romein and Romein-Verschoor (1954) have argued. Yet, as the new 
technologies are now becoming globally available, a worldwide market for food 
products and food technologies will no longer regard the West as ‘‘deviant (either 
in a positive or in a negative sense) as new global forms of life, based on globalized 
food production, are emerging.
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